INTRODUCTION
A multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem grasps the exploration-exploitation dilemma, which is the fundamental trade-off in animal decision-making [Sutton & Barto, 1998; Gittins, 1979] . The decision maker must strike an optimal balance between taking an immediate reward by exploiting the option that has yielded the largest cumulative payoff and exploring other options to acquire more information about their expected payoffs. The majority of previous research has focused on comparing an individual decision performance against optimal policies in the context of individual reinforcement learning [Cohen, McClure & Yu, 2007] .
Given the rapid proliferation of advanced information technologies, including the Internet, modern humans can easily access vast amount of socially transmitted information. Intuitively, this situation is isomorphic to some eusocial insects that are known to solve the exploration-exploitation dilemma collectively through information transfer (e.g., honeybees [Seeley et al., 1991] ; and ants [Shaffer, Sasaki & Pratt, 2013] ). Yet, in contrast from the eusocial insects, whose colonies are composed of kin, human collective performance may be affected by an inherent free-rider problem [Bolton & Harris, 1999; Kameda, Tsukasaki, Hastie & Berg, 2011] . Specifically, in groups involving non-kin members, it is expected that free-riders, who allow others to search for better alternatives and then exploit their findings through social learning ("information scroungers"), will frequently appear, and consequently undermine the advantage of collective intelligence [Rogers, 1998; Kameda & Nakanishi, 2003] .
We focused on information transfer processes utilized by many of the "buzz-marketing" web sites, where consumers can learn about how other consumers have evaluated various products ("evaluation information", e.g., the 5-star rating system on Amazon.com), as well as how many others have purchased those products ("frequency information"). Does such information-sharing systems in fact improve performance in relation to the MAB problem? And, if so, how do the two types of social information, the frequency information and the evaluation information, affect our decisions?
We addressed this question through a laboratory experiment. A group of 5 participants were provided a series of thirty-armed bandit problems (Fig. 1) . In each round, participants individually chose one option from 30 alternatives and received payoffs as personal rewards. In addition to the private payoff-feedback, information about other members' previous choice behaviors was publicly available during each round. We set up two conditions concerning the public information: (1) the 'frequency only' condition where individuals were informed of how many members had chosen each of the 30 alternatives in the preceding period; and (2) the 'frequency & evaluation' condition where, in addition to the social-frequency information, individuals could also learn other members' evaluations of their chosen-alternatives on a 5-point rating scale. As a baseline, we also had the individual condition where participants solved the task alone. In addition to the frequency information (black colored numbers), participants could see average ratings (red colored numbers) for each of the boxes that were evaluated during the previous round. The horizontal red bar indicated that no evaluation was contributed for that box during the preceding round. There was no social information feedback provided during the first round.
RESULTS SUMMARY
Did the information-sharing systems improve performance on the MAB problem? 2.1 -Yes. Fig. 2 -a shows the total performances of social condition and individual condition. How did the 5-point rating system affect the performance? 2.3 -"Less-is-more" effect emerged. Fig. 3 shows a negative correlation between the total amounts of shared evaluations within a group and the total performance of each individual. Fig.3 The horizontal axis shows the total amounts of shared evaluations within a group (minimum: 0, maximum: 500), and the vertical axis shows the total performance of each participant (minimum: 100, maximum: 600). Group identities are shown as different colors (participants belonging to the same group align on the same vertical line). The point size indicates exploration times of each participant (minimum: 1, maximum: 100).
DISCUSSION
Our results show that subjective evaluation information could undermine the benefit of collective intelligence through social learning in a multi-armed bandit problem. The average performance in the frequency only condition was higher than that in more informatized condition in which participants' subjective evaluations were also shared ( Fig. 2-b) . Moreover, in the frequency & evaluation condition, the amount of shared evaluation information was negatively correlated with individual total performance (Fig. 3) . It has been argued that social influences sometimes undermine the effects of collective intelligence at simple estimation tasks [Lorenz et al. 2011 ]. In the estimation task of Lorenz et al. (2011) , participants each had an opportunity to reconsider their response to factual questions after having received information about the responses of other participants. They concluded that social information had negative effects in terms of the accuracy of decision-making. Such simple estimation tasks have been broadly used in human collective intelligence studies [Galton, 1907; Krause et al. 2011] . However, such protocols have overlooked an important aspect of the nature of animal decisionmaking due to focusing only on the accuracy, and therefore failing to assess the cost-benefit trade-offs made through the whole decision processes. Since we would like to know the functional consequences of information transfer within a group, a framework that considers both the cost of information searching and the benefits of decision accuracy is required. Using the multi-armed bandit problem, we have provided the insight that the benefit of information transfer comes not only from improving the accuracy of decisions, but also in saving from the costs of exploration.
